|
|
| Learning nuclear debate |
| Zahir Kazmi |
| “There are many cumbersome ways to kill a man,” goes the title of Edwin Brock’s 1997 poem. He says that “in the age of aeroplanes, one may fly miles above his victim and dispose of him by pressing one small switch. All one then requires is an ocean to separate him, two systems of government...” With 62 years of animus and contiguous borders, the sub-continent’s situation is more complex.
Nuclearisation, the advent of missiles and terrorism has transformed everything between the two rivals except their way of thinking. Brock couldn’t have visualised that the ways of killing would become “easier”, as today’s soldier on the front line less susceptible to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction than his family back home.
If we are in unison on this notion, then we may also concur that the debate to prevent or fight a war is no more the domain and discourse of selected few. There is, however, a caveat; for the civilians to learn the art of war they have to first understand and learn the debate. Do they?
US learnt this way of thinking in Kennedy’s era—-sixteen years after becoming a nuclear power. When Robert McNamara took over the Pentagon in 1961 and started axing weapons programmes, the uniformed military went berserk. McNamara brought in some arrogant young “whiz kids” from the RAND Corporation and Alain Enthoven, 29, was amongst them. He told an Air Force General, who tried to lecture him on nuclear-war plans, “General, I have fought just as many nuclear wars as you have” (Fred Kaplan, 2004).
Good news about Pakistan is that a group of around forty such newbie scholars is learning strategic and nuclear affairs at the National Defence University. One can only hope that these whiz kids aren’t as haughty and enter the policy making rungs to advise the Prime Minister and the National Command Authority whether to press “the button” or not.
Again there is no reason why the general public should not be aware of the nuclear debate, as it affects them more than the soldier on the front line.
Year 2010 has some landmark decisions up its sleeve and may turn out to be a watershed of 21st century. The debate is led by the US, whose nuclear agenda includes renewing formal arms control agreements with Russia, rejuvenating a strategic dialogue with China, pushing for ratification of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), repairing the damaged nuclear non-proliferation regime, and redoubling efforts to reduce and secure fissile material that may be used in weapons (Ferguson, Foreign Affairs, 2010).
Obama holds these five goals as his administration’s priority and promises to achieve the so-called Nuclear Zero, which he himself admits may not occur in his lifetime. Here lies the catch that can sum up the entire nuclear argument. If America, with the largest military structure that the human history has ever seen cannot give up its nukes why and how will rest of the world be encouraged to disarm?
Obama’s promise will remain a pipe-dream till the US and other veto-wielders do not address the insecurities of the under-dogs; do not diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies; and reduce the proliferation risks from the states that betray international trust to divert resources from civilian nuclear programmes for building nukes. Many states have espoused nuclear ambitions but the NPT (Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty) of 1970 formed an effective regime that stymied spread of nuclear weapons. India, Israel, and Pakistan did not sign the treaty mainly because it divides the world in to nuclear ‘haves and have-nots’.
The NPT suffered a major setback once the US violated it, ditched the rightful signatories and bent its own laws to share civil nuclear technology and materials with India in 2006. This technically enabled India to use freed-up resources to potentially produce fissile material for at least 280 nuclear weapons a year.
Since India gained quantitative advantage to produce more fissile material, Pakistan questioned the CD’s (Conference on Disarmament, Geneva) negotiation framework that only focuses on ‘cutting-off’ further production. Ironically, delays in reaching a consensus at the CD will only exacerbate the nuclear arms race with India. Ratification of CTBT is another challenge that Obama has taken. History bears witness that US Senate has never reversed a decision and it is not likely to change heart on its 1999 decision.
‘Disarmament-charity’ begins at home and the de jure nuclear weapons states (US, Russia, UK, France and China) will have to take credible measures towards nuclear disarmament by gradually giving up their 23,220 weapons (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 2009); an arsenal that can destroy the world many times over. America and Russia will have to conclude their bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty on the lines that they promise to eliminate their nuclear arsenals (9,400 and 13,000 respectively) in a well-defined time frame. Once US-Russian nuclear arsenal equal France’s (300), they can engage China (240), Britain (180), India (100+), Israel (100), Pakistan (70) and North Korea to follow their footsteps. The quoted figures are mere approximations. US will have to consider disarmament in conventional weapons too as it enjoys superiority.
Japan, South Korea, and other non-nuclear NATO states have the wherewithal to make weapons within months. To stop them from quitting US nuclear umbrella, the latter will have to make its deterrence against North Korea more credible and explicit.
The Gordian knot for a nuclear zero lies in Jammu and Kashmir too. Even if China disarms, India will not give up nukes due to the animus with Pakistan and the latter will respond in kind. The US and the other P-5 members will have to use their leverage with India and Pakistan to decide the festering issue, as ensconced in UN resolutions and according to the wishes of the embittered Kashmiris.
India’s openness to resume dialogue, even if it is to earn brownie points before hosting Commonwealth 2010 Games, with Pakistan is a silver lining.
As a parting thought, we must understand that we live in an anarchic world where every state has to fend for its security. Considering the Kashmir issue is resolved; will the two states actually disarm? Won’t they fight over something else? Let’s say the blue-gold!
zahirhkazmi@aol.com |
|
|